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Introduction.  Only those South Carolina healthcare 
providers who were already in practice in 1968-69 have 
had prior experience with a global influenza pandemic.  
That was the year that Influenza A H3N2 abruptly 
replaced the H2N2 strain, which had been circulating 
since the 1957-58 flu season.  Those of us who have 
entered practice since then are familiar with the usual 
“winter flu season” in general and with numerous faces of 
clinical influenza in particular, but have never had to 
practice in a pandemic setting.  Even though the current 
novel H1N1 pandemic strain has fortunately (to-date!) 
been associated with a relatively low case-fatality rate 
(CFR) (just a fraction of 1% of cases have died), the 
effects of H1N1 on medical practice and on society may 
be considerable this coming flu season.  Indeed the 
coming of cooler weather and the start of the school year 
have already combined to facilitate transmission, and 
there is surely more to come! 
The virus first appeared in the United States and in South 
Carolina in April after cases had already been reported 
from Mexico.  The 
virus, was initially 
referred to as the 
“Swine Flu” virus, 
then came to be 
known by a 
variety of names, 
but is now 
commonly called 
the “Novel H1N1” 
virus or more 
simply as “H1N1”.  
This name is 
ambiguous in a formal sense as “ordinary seasonal H1N1” 
viruses have been circulating worldwide for several 
decades.  This new virus was quickly found to be so novel 
genetically and antigenically that most humans were 
susceptible to it,  and indeed its pandemic potential was 
soon confirmed when it spread in just a few weeks not 
only to all 50 states in the USA but to over 150 countries 
as well!  This was in sharp contrast to the avian H5N1 
“bird flu” strain which, because of its frighteningly high 
CFR (~70%) has been of great concern for several years 
but has never demonstrated ability to sustain 
transmission in human populations.  On June 19, the 
World Health Organization raised its pandemic influenza 
phase alert to level 6 (the highest phase) which signified 
that transmission with this novel virus was ongoing 
worldwide.  Fortunately, elsewhere, as here, the virus has 
not proven to be exceptionally virulent.   
In any case, the pandemic has evolved so quickly that 
even infectious disease and public health specialists have 
found it difficult to keep up with the flood of information 
and the nuances of ever evolving guidelines as are, for 
example, posted on CDC’s extensive website devoted to 
H1N1 (www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu).  In this article, we touch 
only on selected aspects of the pandemic, both from the 
clinical and population-health points of view, while 
recognizing that essentially everything that can be said on 
the subject must be considered as incomplete and as part 
of an evolving story.   
(Continued on page 2) 
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Course of the 2008-2009 Flu Season.  In a sense the 
story to date can be seen in Figure 1.  By week 16 of 
2009 (mid-April) it appeared that the 2008-2009 flu 
season was over.  However, pandemic H1N1 then arrived 
leading to an unusual summertime influenza epidemic as 
depicted.  The figure also shows that essentially all 
summer influenza was due to novel H1N1 as seasonal 
H1N1 and H3N2 strains had essentially vanished from 
circulation by July.  The figure shown is updated weekly 
on the CDC web site at www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly, where 
it, along with other informative data, can help inform 
clinical practice for primary care physicians, showing, for 
example, just “which virus is going around,” and the 
latest trends in the extent and severity of illness seen in 
clinical settings around the country.   
Data summarized in the figure also inform decisions 
regarding antiviral therapy.  Thus, as long as novel H1N1 
is the predominant circulating strain, oseltamivir – when 
indicated -- can be used with confidence because, to 
date, novel H1N1 has shown only occasional resistance to 
the drug.  On the other hand, if and 
when seasonal H1N1 strains start to 
appear in important numbers, then 
decisions about antiviral therapy will 
become more complex as that 
seasonal strain exhibited high level 
oseltamivir resistance last year and 
can probably be expected to do so 
in the coming 2009-2010 flu season 
as well.  In any case, these points 
illustrate the fact that in the current 
context, the key to certain clinical 
decisions making lies not in the “lab 
report” of a single patient, but on 
information posted on CDC’s web 
site which summarizes the collective 
experience of healthcare providers 
and patients from around the 
country. 
Evolution of Public Health and 
Clinical Care Approaches to 
Novel H1N1: April to October 
2009.  When novel H1N1 first 
appeared, little was known about 
the virus, its virulence, or the extent 
to which it would spread.  In South 
Carolina then, as in many other 
states and indeed in many countries 
around the world, initial attempts were made to see if the 
virus could be totally “contained.”  One precedent for 
thinking this might be possible came from the SARS 
experience in 2003 when the SARS coronavirus did 
spread to numerous countries but, due in part to inherent 
characteristics of the virus itself, and in part to vigorous 
isolation and other public health measures, proved to be 
incapable of sustained transmission.  These factors led to 
the SARS epidemic “dying out” by June of that year.   
Unlike SARS, Novel H1N1 quickly exhibited transmission 
characteristics of seasonal influenza viruses and thus 
spread around the world, rendering “containment” 
attempts moot.  Thus, by late May, South Carolina 
transitioned from “containment mode” to “mitigation 
mode” with the more modest, but still important objective 
of diminishing the impact of the virus in terms of 
morbidity, mortality, and social disruption.   
(Continued from page 1) 
(Continued on page 4) 
Figure 1: Influenza Positive Tests Reported to CDC by U.S.  WHO/
NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories, National Summary, 2008-2009 
(From: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/, as accessed October 5, 2009) 
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Table 1: Evolution of Perspectives and Practices as the Novel H1N1 Pandemic has Unfolded: April – 
October 2009.  Part A: Broad Societal and Public Health Issues 
Item Initial “Containment Phase” 
Current (and still evolving) “Mitigation 
Phase” 
Situational assessment Possible start of a "category 5” pandemic. Ongoing evolution of a "category 1 or 2" 
pandemic. 
General societal / public health 
objectives 
Interrupt transmission.  Abort the outbreak. Mitigate / moderate medical and social impact 
of the pandemic.  Favorably modify epidemic 
curve in each community (see Fig 2) 
Community attack rate (AR) 
expected 
Unknown.  Possibly catastrophic if category 5 
pandemic.  Possibly limited if transmission 
aborted 
Unknown but likely high (e.g.  ~30+% of 
population might become infected.) 
Case fatality rate (CFR) High CFR feared (cf. Global H5N1 experience 
to date with CFR~70%) 
Low CFR observed( <1.0% or even<0.2%?) 
Eventual no. of deaths 
expected. 
Function of community attack rate (AR) and 
case-fatality rate (CFR) 
Function of AR and CFR.  Even low CFR may 
result in many deaths if AR is high.  However, 
vaccine can reduce deaths if coverage and 
vaccine efficacy are high (see Table 3 for 
sample calculations) 
Attempt to identify every case Yes, (initially very few cases e.g.  dozens) No longer possible or desirable ( many 
thousands of cases) 
Aggressive isolation of all cases 
and quarantine of all contacts 
attempted/considered 
Yes No (though common sense (stay home when 
sick etc.) certainly applies 
Some key objectives of public 
health surveillance 
Focus on individuals: 
(a) detect arrival of virus in the community 
(b) monitor efficacy of "containment strategy" 
(c) early local characterization of pandemic 
according to time, place and person 
Focus on overall impact: 
(a) monitor progression of the pandemic and its 
eventual relation to "regular seasonal flu" 
(b) monitor "severity" through reports of 
hospitalizations and deaths 
Vaccine available No (but the need to produce one was 
apparent from start) 
Yes (but just starting to be released,  and time 
is needed before all needed doses will be 
available) 
Stress on health care providers/ 
facilities 
Limited because of small numbers of cases May increase as flu-season progresses (e.g.,  
great demand "to be seen" + HCWs themselves 
absent + possible  shortage of beds, ICU spots 
or respirators 
Understanding of the pandemic Little insight (too early), course  not 
predictable 
Ever improving, but detailed course still not 
predictable 
Constantly evolving /unresolved  
issues. 
Yes Yes 
Guidance from CDC  
(www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu) 
Flood of complex ever-changing documents Flood of more complex, more numerous ever-
changing documents 
Media attention Focus on arrival of a new novel virus Potential focus on deaths, vaccine side effects, 
social disruption, as well as on general course 
of the pandemic. 
Social disruption Focused, limited to small number of persons 
and institutions 
Potentially widespread (e.g., waves of school 
absenteeism; occasional school closures; 
workplace absenteeism, etc.) 
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Table 1 (pages 3 & 4) presents a summary of how the 
approach to novel H1N1 has evolved accordingly since 
those “early April days.”  The table is schematic in nature, 
presenting issues in “broad strokes,” and is not meant to 
prejudge every and all clinical encounter (or public health 
situation) where many factors must be taken into account 
when decisions are made.  Nonetheless, the table 
provides a broad sense of the manner in which issues and 
practice have generally evolved in the last six months. 
Antiviral Therapy for Novel H1N1.  While Table 1 
presented some of the issues surrounding evolution of 
approaches to antiviral therapy in broad strokes, Table 2, 
excerpted from the most recent CDC postings 
(www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/recommendations.htm) provides 
finer grained detail.  It should be noted that this posting, 
like all others related to novel H1N1, should be taken as 
“interim” and subject to modification as the flu season 
unfolds.  Periodic (e.g.  weekly) consultation of CDC’s 
web site is highly recommended for healthcare providers 
whose practice includes management of patients with 
influenza-like illnesses. 
(Continued from page 2) 
(Continued on page 6) 
Table 1: Evolution of Perspectives and Practices as the Novel H1N1 Pandemic has Unfolded: April – 
October 2009.  Part B: Clinical Issues 
Item Initial “Containment Phase” Current (and still evolving” “Mitigation Phase” 
Recommended that all possible 
"Swine Flu" cases seek medical care 
Yes: important early on to try to 
identify all cases 
No.  Persons with mild ILI and with no "high-risk" 
factors typically need not seek care, and should NOT 
go to ER/EDs 
Rapid Flu Tests (RFTs) for Influenza 
A helpful 
Positive tests most likely indicate Influenza A.  Test specificity reasonably good, ~85% in 
some reviews. Negative tests do not rule out Influenza A (Poor sensitivity, e.g., ~50%) 
Specific viral diagnosis (real-time RT-
PCR or viral culture) sought for 
every suspect case 
Yes No, confirmation now sought for subsets of cases such 
as hospitalized or died from ILI; part of cluster or 
outbreak (e.g., in a residential care facility), 
exceptionally for others of special consequence 
Emphasis on antiviral treatment for 
all confirmed or suspected cases. 
Yes Not necessarily.  Emphasis for example on treating 
patients with severe symptoms; clinical deterioration; 
or in groups at high-risk of severe disease or death 
with reasonable clinical judgment for others 
(See www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/recommendations.htm) 
Emphasis on antiviral post-exposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) for all contacts. 
Yes No.  PEP emphasis for example for close contacts at 
higher risk for influenza-related complications.  Early 
treatment is an emerging emphasized alternative to 
PEP after a suspected exposure.  (See www.cdc.gov/
h1n1flu/recommendations.htm) 
Focus and importance of Physician 
Reporting 
Every suspect case of interest 
(e.g., ILI in April after return from 
trip to Mexico) 
Focus no longer on every ILI  or even every 
“confirmed case”, but now shifted to: 
(a) patients hospitalized with ILI in whom 
influenza is suspected as cause of illness; 
(b) patients deceased or dying of ILI illness (with 
or without bacterial co-infection or super-infection) (cf. 
MMWR Sept 25, 2009 re Bacterial co-infections.)   
Reporting of such cases requested;  and culture for 
influenza virus suggested for all such patients, 
especially for those for whom a Rapid Flu Test (RFT) 
was also obtained, regardless of results of the RFT 
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Table 2: USPHS (CDC) Recommendations for the Use of Influenza Antiviral Drugs 
♦ Most healthy persons who develop an illness consistent with influenza, or persons who appear to be recovering from influenza, 
do not need antiviral medications for treatment or prophylaxis.  However, persons presenting with suspected influenza and more 
severe symptoms such as evidence of lower respiratory tract infection or clinical deterioration should receive prompt empiric 
antiviral therapy, regardless of previous health or age. 
♦ Treatment with oseltamivir or zanamivir is recommended for all persons with suspected or confirmed influenza requiring 
hospitalization. 
♦ Early empiric treatment with oseltamivir or zanamivir should be considered for persons with suspected or confirmed influenza 
who are at higher risk for complications (*) including: 
◊ Children younger than 2 years of age; 
◊ Persons aged 65 years or older; 
◊ Pregnant women; 
◊ Persons of any age with certain chronic medical or immunosuppressive conditions; and 
◊ Persons younger than 19 years of age who are receiving long-term aspirin therapy. 
♦ Children 2 year to 4 years old are more likely to require hospitalization or urgent medical evaluation for influenza compared with 
older children, although the risk is much lower than for children younger than 2 years old.  Children aged 2 years to 4 years 
without high risk conditions and with mild illness do not necessarily require antiviral treatment. 
♦ Treatment, when indicated, should be initiated as early as possible because studies show that treatment initiated early (i.e., 
within 48 hours of illness onset) is more likely to provide benefit.  (**)  
♦ Actions that should be taken to reduce delays in treatment initiation include: 
◊ Informing persons at higher risk for influenza complications of signs and symptoms of influenza and need for early 
treatment after onset of symptoms of influenza (i.e., fever, respiratory symptoms); 
◊ Ensuring rapid access to telephone consultation and clinical evaluation for these patients as well as patients who report 
severe illness; 
◊ Considering empiric treatment of patients at higher risk for influenza complications based on telephone contact if 
hospitalization is not indicated and if this will substantially reduce delay before treatment is initiated. 
◊ Treatment should not wait for laboratory confirmation of influenza because laboratory testing can delay treatment and 
because a negative rapid test for influenza does not rule out influenza.  The sensitivity of rapid tests in detecting 2009 H1N1 
has ranged from 10% to 70%.  Information on the use of rapid influenza diagnostic tests (RIDTs) can be found at 
www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/guidance/rapid_testing.htm. 
◊ Testing for 2009 H1N1 influenza infection with real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (real-time RT-PCR) 
should be prioritized for persons with suspected or confirmed influenza requiring hospitalization and based on guidelines 
from local and state health departments. 
♦ Consideration for antiviral postexposure chemoprophylaxis should generally be reserved for persons at higher risk for influenza-
related complications who have had contact with someone likely to have been infected with influenza.  However, early treatment 
is an emphasized alternative to chemoprophylaxis after a suspected exposure.  Household or close contacts (with risk factors for 
influenza complications) of confirmed or suspected cases can be counseled about the early signs and symptoms of influenza, 
and advised to immediately contact their health care provider for evaluation and possible early treatment if clinical signs or 
symptoms develop. 
♦ Currently circulating 2009 Novel H1N1 viruses are susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir, but resistant to amantadine and 
rimantadine; however, antiviral treatment regimens might change according to new antiviral resistance or viral surveillance 
information. 
(Excerpted from www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/recommendations.htm as updated 9/22/2009 and accessed 10/4/2009) 
DHEC Notes from Table 2:   
(*)  In some clinical settings “higher risk conditions” may be more common than might be expected.  Thus, in the setting of an influenza-
like illness it is useful to question the patient specifically about the presence of such conditions as may influence decisions about prescrip-
tion of antivirals. 
(**) On another web page (www.cdc.gov/H1N1flu/antiviral.htm)  CDC provides additional guidance as follows: “However, some studies of 
oseltamivir treatment of hospitalized patients with seasonal influenza have indicated benefit, including reductions in mortality or duration 
of hospitalization even for patients whose treatment was started more than 48 hours after illness onset.” 
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Morbidity and Mortality from Novel H1N1: What 
Can We Anticipate? 
If the 1918 influenza pandemic may be considered to 
have been a “Category 5” (Katrina-like) pandemic, the 
current pandemic might so far be characterized as a 
“Category 1 or 2” (see Table 7 below).  But pandemics, 
like hurricanes, can lose or gain strength and their final 
outcomes are not always foreseeable.  Further, in this 
pandemic, there has been time to prepare a vaccine 
against the offending strain.   
In a broad sense, we can anticipate that the number of 
South Carolina deaths that may eventually be attributable 
to H1N1 will depend on four parameters:  
a) The attack rate (percent of the population which 
will be infected);  
b) The case-fatality rate (percent of cases which will 
have a fatal outcome);  
c) Vaccine coverage (percent of the population which 
will receive H1N1 vaccine); and  
d) Vaccine efficacy (percent vaccinated persons who 
will be “protected”).   
This line of argument is somewhat simplified, but is 
conceptually helpful, and outcomes under various 
scenarios are shown in Table 3. 
The scenarios differ according to the hypothetical values 
assumed for the four parameters.  For example, scenarios 
A and B assume no vaccine, but differ in the mortality 
estimates because of different assumed values for attack 
rates and case-fatality rates.  Scenarios C, D, E, and F 
assume the same initial conditions as Scenario B, but add 
then various combinations of high and low values for 
vaccine coverage and vaccine efficacy.  The arithmetic 
presented via these model scenarios demonstrates the 
life-saving value of achieving high-vaccine coverage even 
for a vaccine that would not be 100% protective.  It is 
easy to see that deaths might be considerably higher if 
the attack rate were 
higher and/or, if the 
case-fatality rate were 
higher than the 
relatively low value 
used in these 
examples.   
H1N1 Vaccine and 
Pregnancy.  This flu 
season, we can expect 
to see considerable 
attention paid to 
prevention of influenza in pregnancy.  Although the 
pandemic is still in its early stages, the special risks of 
H1N1 and pregnancy have already been documented in 
the literature (CDC, 2009a; Jamieson, et al, 2009).  Even 
though severe H1N1 illness and death have in general 
been relatively rare, certain sub-groups – including 
pregnant women -- have already been found to be at 
higher risk of complications, such as pneumonia, and 
even death.  In addition to these dangers for the mother, 
the hyperthermia that accompanies influenza in 
pregnancy places fetuses at risk for complications such as 
birth defects or preterm birth. 
In recent years there has, in any case, been a gradual 
evolution in use of trivalent inactivated influenza vaccines 
(TIV) in pregnancy.  For example, in 1993 vaccine was 
recommended only for pregnant women with medical 
conditions known to increase risk for complications from 
influenza.  By 1998, indications had broadened to include 
any women who would be in the 2nd or 3rd trimester of 
pregnancy in the flu season.  More recently, 
recommendations have further broadened so that 
(Continued from page 4) 
(Continued on page 7) 
Table 3:  Cases and Deaths from novel H1N1 under illustrative scenarios 
Parameter Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario  D Scenario  E Scenario F
a SC Population 4,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000
b H1N1 Attack Rate as % 20% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
c H1N1 Cases (a x b) 800,000      1,200,000   1,200,000   1,200,000   1,200,000   1,200,000   
d H1N1 Case Fatality Rate as % 0.01% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
e Deaths if no vaccine (c x d) 80               600             600             600             600             600             
f Vaccine coverage as % 0% 0% 50% 80% 50% 80%
g Vaccine efficacy as % 0% 0% 50% 50% 80% 80%
h Deaths (e - (fxgxe)) 80               600             450             360             360             216             
Periodic (e.g., weekly) 
consultation of CDC’s 
web site is highly 
recommended for 
healthcare providers 
whose practice 
includes management 
of patients with 
influenza-like illnesses 
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vaccination is now advised for all women who are 
pregnant during the flu season - regardless of the 
trimester of gestation.  This approach has been 
reaffirmed in the recently published ACIP 
recommendations regarding both seasonal flu vaccine 
(CDC, 2009b) and novel H1N1 vaccine (CDC, 2009c).  
Thus, Table 4 shows the American Committee on 
Immunization Practice’s (ACIP) initial target groups for 
receipt of H1N1 vaccine with pregnant women leading the 
list.  In addition, Table 6 (page 8) presents a number of 
“take home messages” concerning influenza, influenza 
vaccine and pregnancy as recently posted on the 
American College of Obstetrician and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) web site and as endorsed not only by ACOG but 
also by a coalition of seven other professional 
organizations including the American Academy of 
Pediatrics (AAP) and the American Academy of Family 
Physicians (AAFP). 
Simultaneous 
administration of the 
two 2009-2010 
influenza Vaccines.  
Two influenza vaccines 
will be available this year: 
(a) typical trivalent 
seasonal influenza 
vaccine incorporating, as 
in recent years (i) non-pandemic influenza A H1N1, (ii) 
influenza A H3N2, and (iii) influenza B strains.  At the 
time this was written (in early October) seasonal vaccine 
was already gradually becoming available in South 
Carolina and within a few weeks, the novel H1N1 vaccine 
should also be arriving.  Both will be available (i) as 
injectable inactivated virus vaccines, and (ii) as live-
attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) for intranasal 
administration.  Because of production and delivery 
schedules, many or most patients are likely to receive 
(Continued from page 6) 
(Continued on page 8)  
Table 4: ACIP Initial target groups for novel influenza A (H1N1) 2009-2010 vaccination programs (CDC, 2009b) 
♦ Pregnant women because they are at higher risk of complications and can potentially provide protection to infants who 
cannot be vaccinated; 
♦ Household contacts and caregivers for children younger than 6 months of age because younger infants are at 
higher risk of influenza-related complications and cannot be vaccinated.  Vaccination of those in close contact with 
infants less than 6 months old might help protect infants by “cocooning” them from the virus; 
♦ Healthcare and emergency medical services personnel because infections among healthcare workers have been 
reported and this can be a potential source of infection for vulnerable patients.  Also, increased absenteeism in this 
population could reduce healthcare system capacity; 
♦ All people from 6 months through 24 years of age; 
♦ Children from 6 months through 18 years of age because we have seen many cases of novel H1N1 influenza in 
children and they are in close contact with each other in school and day care settings, which increases the likelihood of 
disease spread,  
♦ Young adults 19 through 24 years of age because we have seen many cases of novel H1N1 influenza in these 
healthy young adults and they often live, work, and study in close proximity, and they are a frequently mobile 
population; and, 
♦ Persons aged 25 through 64 years who have health conditions associated with higher risk of medical 
complications from influenza. 
 
Table 5: Possible 
Simultaneous Administration 
of the 2009-2010 Influenza 
Vaccines 
In f lue nz a va cc ine  c om binat ions
S im ulta neous  
a dm in is tra tion  app rove d
Inje cta ble s eas on al +   in je ctab le H1 N1 Ye s
Inje cta ble s eas on al +   intra na sa l H 1N 1 Ye s
Intra na sa l s ea s ona l +  injec tab le  H1 N1 Ye s
Intra na sa l s ea s ona l +  intran as al H 1N 1 No
Influenza vaccination 
is now advised for all 
women who are 
pregnant during the 
flu season -- 
regardless of the 
trimester of gestation 
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seasonal vaccine first and only receive H1N1 vaccine later 
in the year as this second vaccine gradually becomes 
available.  Nonetheless, as summarized in Table 5, 
except for simultaneous use of both LAIV preparations, 
which is NOT recommended, it would be possible, if 
necessary and/or convenient, to vaccinate patients 
against both the seasonal and pandemic H1N1 strains at 
the same visit. 
Community Mitigation Perspectives.  Tools available 
to control influenza include “pharmaceutical 
interventions” such as vaccines and antivirals but also an 
entire panoply of “non-pharmaceutical interventions” 
ranging from simple education about “cough-etiquette” to 
more socially invasive interventions such as isolation of 
cases, quarantine of contacts, school closings, and 
cancellation of large public gatherings.   
Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United 
States— Early, Targeted, Layered Use of 
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions is an extensively 
thorough and fascinating document concerning non-
pharmaceutical interventions.  It was prepared by the 
CDC, has been widely used for public health planning 
purposes, and is available on-line from the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) at the link indicated 
in the reference list (DHHS, 2007).  The extent to which 
such interventions might be used can depend on the 
pandemic’s severity category as measured by the case-
fatality-rate according to the schematic scale (reminiscent 
of the familiar hurricane category scale) as shown in 
Table 7.  Thus, more dramatic societal measures such as 
closing schools or cancelling large collective events (e.g., 
(Continued from page 7) 
(Continued on page 9) 
Table 6: Urgent Joint Statement for Pregnant Women about Influenza (**) (ACOG, 2009) 
The normal changes of pregnancy make pregnant women at increased risk of the harmful effects of flu infection.  
For the health of pregnant women and their developing babies, please take this message seriously.  
Pregnant women are at increased risk for serious disease and even death from pandemic H1N1 influenza infection.  
Pregnant women, who have flu-like symptoms such as fever, cough and sore throat should contact  their preg-
nancy care provider immediately so that flu medications can be started and further instructions can be given by 
their provider.  They may also begin treating their fever with acetaminophen (i.e., Tylenol).  
Pregnant women should also speak to their pregnancy care provider if they have come in close contact with some-
one who has flu-like symptoms.  
We strongly recommend all pregnant women receive immunization for seasonal flu NOW and H1N1 flu as soon as 
this vaccine becomes available.  The immunizations pregnant women receive are safe and provide flu protection 
for both themselves and their newborns.  
Pregnant women can protect themselves from the flu by washing their hands frequently, by encouraging their fam-
ily to do the same, and by avoiding contact with sick people. 
(**) Endorsed by American Academy of Family Physicians; American Academy of Pediatrics; American College of Nurse-Midwives; 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; Association of Women’s Health, Obstetric, and Neonatal Nurses; Infectious 
Disease Society for Obstetrics and Gynecology; March of Dimes Foundation, and Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine. 
Table 7: Pandemic Severity Index 
Pandemic 
Severity 
Category 
Case 
Fatality Rate 
Projected No. US 
Deaths 
5 >2.0% >1,800,000 
4 1.0 to <2.0% 
900,000 to 
<1,800,000 
3 0.5 to <1.0% 450,000 to <900,000 
2 0.1 to <0.5% 90,000 to <450,000 
1 <0.1% <90,000 
Source: DHHS, 20078 
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concerts or graduations) might be appropriate in 
some settings for category 4 or 5 pandemics, but 
would typically not be appropriate for Category 1 or 
2 pandemics.   
As presented in Table 1 (Part A, page 3), when 
H1N1 emerged in April, DHEC initially adopted a 
containment strategy including isolation and 
quarantine.  Containment strategies can be applied:  
◊ shortly after introduction of a novel virus as part 
of attempt  to “contain” and hence totally 
interrupt transmission, and thus literally abort 
an outbreak or epidemic, or  
◊ as part of aggressive initial public health efforts 
to “gain time” for the public and the health 
care system by slowing the otherwise rapid 
initial expansion phase of an outbreak,  even 
though it may not be possible to totally abort 
it.   
The value of containment and mitigation in this sense are 
shown schematically in Figure 2 where the goals of such 
efforts can be interpreted geometrically as they seek to: 
1) Diminish overall morbidity and mortality (reducing 
the area under the epidemic curve) 
2) Decompress peak burden on waiting rooms, 
doctor’s offices, hospitals (lowering the height of 
the peak) 
3) Delay the outbreak peak (pushing the epidemic 
curve to the right, ideally until such time as vaccine 
becomes available which, with good coverage and 
even reasonable efficacy can then further reduce 
the “area under the morbidity curve”.) 
From one perspective, the general common sense advice 
given to the public (stay home if you are ill; cover your 
cough; etc.) or even the procedures used in EDs or some 
physician’s offices (having separate waiting areas for 
persons with ILI with cough, etc.) appear to affect only 
the few individuals concerned in each instance or setting.  
From a broader perspective, however, the sum of all such 
gestures, policies and procedures taken collectively can, 
and does, have an impact on the shape of the influenza 
Epi-curve in a community and thus in a real sense helps 
to achieve the three goals listed above. 
School Closures.  This fall it will be inevitable that H1N1 
will circulate in schools as well as in the wider community, 
and in some situations (e.g., when school absenteeism is 
very high) questions will arise about whether a particular 
school ought to close for a number of days.  CDC has 
helpfully addressed this issue in some detail and provides 
guidance for colleges and universities, K-12 schools, and 
child care programs.  Guidance is continuously updated at 
www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/schools.  The general sense of the 
guidance is that   
“… decisions to dismiss students should be made 
locally and should balance the goal of reducing the 
number of people who become seriously ill or die 
from influenza with the goal of minimizing social 
disruption and safety risks to children sometimes 
associated with school dismissal.  ... the potential 
benefits of preemptively dismissing students from 
school are often outweighed by negative 
consequences, including students being left home 
alone, health workers missing shifts when they 
must stay home with their children, students 
missing meals, and interruption of students’ 
education.”  (CDC, 2009d) 
DHEC has provided guidance along similar lines in Health 
Advisories for Schools, stating: 
"School closure is not advised for a single or small 
number of suspected or confirmed cases of 
influenza (including Novel H1N1 Influenza) and, in 
general, is not advised unless there is a magnitude 
of faculty or student absenteeism that interferes 
(Continued on page 10) 
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with the school’s ability to function”  (DHEC, 
2009a). 
Any decisions made about school closings will naturally 
have advantages and disadvantages.  DHEC continues to 
work both at the state level with the Department of 
Education and at the local level with district 
superintendents and school principles and school nurses 
who are on the front-lines of such issues.  Further 
guidance for schools may be found at www.cdc.gov/
h1n1flu/schools/schoolguidance.htm and 
www.dhec.sc.gov/flu/swine-flu.htm#sch.  
Influenza Surveillance Notes.  Unlike what is done for 
most diseases of public health importance (e.g., 
tuberculosis, meningococcal meningitis, or pertussis), no 
attempt is made to tally or report every case of influenza.  
The number of cases in the community is so large that it 
would be neither possible nor useful to attempt such a 
tally.  Rather, a good picture of influenza trends is pieced 
together from sources of information regarding:  
◊ positive influenza cultures (see Table 1, Part B, 
line 3);  
◊ consultations for influenza like-illness (ILI) from a 
network of sentinel out-patient providers;   
◊ numbers of positive rapid flu tests from other 
selected collaborating providers;  
◊ influenza hospitalizations; and  
◊ influenza deaths.   
Data regarding hospitalizations and deaths are 
particularly important this pandemic season.  Healthcare 
providers can assist with the completeness and quality of 
these surveillance data by ordering an influenza culture 
for all patients admitted to a hospital because of ILI for 
whom there is a high suspicion or probability that the 
illness is in fact related to influenza.  If influenza is high 
on the differential diagnosis, then a useful rule of thumb 
is that for patients for whom a rapid flu test (RFT) has 
been ordered as part of the admission evaluation – and 
regardless of the result of this RFT – a specimen should 
also be obtained for real-time RT-PCR and/or culture. 
In general, the DHEC laboratory functions as a reference 
and public health surveillance laboratory rather than as a 
diagnostic laboratory for large numbers of patients.  The 
DHEC laboratory does, however, have some capacity to 
perform real-time RT-PCR tests and/or viral cultures for 
ILI patients who are ill-enough to be hospitalized.  Within 
limits of its testing capacity, DHEC will be able to provide 
such testing.  DHEC also monitors the “positivity rate” of 
specimens submitted by different sources.  If DHEC’s 
testing capacity should be exceeded, for example by 
exceptionally high influenza hospitalization rates as might 
be seen later in the flu season, then providers will be so 
notified via the Health Alert Network (HAN), and hospital 
microbiology laboratories will also be so advised.  
Fortunately, a number of private diagnostic laboratories 
(LabCorp, Quest, TriCore and Focus) are now also 
offering testing which can identify the novel H1N1.   
Finally, specimens should also be obtained pre-mortem or 
post-mortem for patients dying from, or having 
succumbed to, an illness that may be influenza 
associated.  Prior recovery of a bacterial pathogen (e.g., 
Streptococcus pneumoniae, Group A streptococcus (S. 
pyogenes), Staphylococcus aureus) does not obviate the 
utility of obtaining viral cultures in the right clinical or 
post-mortem setting, as co-infection with influenza and 
bacterial pathogens is well recognized and has already 
been well documented this pandemic season (CDC, 
2009e). 
Conclusion.  We have reviewed a number of clinical and 
public health aspects of the current Novel H1N1 
pandemic.  Numerous other aspects merit attention in 
different settings (e.g., issues related to infection control 
in hospitals, residential care facilities, or other practice 
settings).  Extensive additional information is available 
from the CDC and DHEC web sites.  Pandemic H1N1 
remains a moving target.  All guidance offered may 
therefore be regarded as interim and a great challenge 
for all of us in the coming months will be to try to keep 
“up-to-date.” 
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Refer frequently to these sites 
• SC DHEC website on Novel H1N1 Influenza: www.scdhec.gov/flu/swine-flu.htm,  
• SC DHEC Flu Surveillance Page: www.scdhec.gov/health/disease/acute/flu.htm,  
• The CDC’s H1N1 page: www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/,  
• The DHHS flu resource page: Flu.gov: www.flu.gov/, and  
• DHEC Health Alerts: www.scdhec.gov/health/disease/han/index.htm). 
If you are a public health professional interested in receiving health notifications from the South Carolina 
Health Alert Network, please contact Shana Dorsey, HAN Coordinator at 803.898.0431 or email DADE-
OC@dhec.sc.gov.  
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Thanksgiving Food Safety 
The following information can help you make sure your traditional turkey dinner is 
prepared safely for the upcoming holiday.  Happy Thanksgiving! 
Thaw safely. Frozen turkey must be thawed safely to avoid foodborne illness. 
There are several options: 
♦ In the refrigerator: Place frozen bird in original wrapper in the 
refrigerator (40 °F or below).  Allow approximately 24 hours per 4 to 5 
pounds of turkey.  A thawed turkey can remain in the refrigerator for 1-2 days. 
♦ In cold water: If you forget to thaw the turkey or don't have room in the refrigerator for thawing, 
don't panic.  You can submerge the turkey in cold water and change the water every 30 minutes.  
Allow about 30 minutes defrosting time per pound of turkey.  Cook immediately after thawing. 
♦ In the microwave: Microwave thawing is safe if the turkey is not too large.  Check the 
manufacturer's instructions for the size turkey that will fit into your microwave, the minutes per 
pound, and the power level to use for thawing.  Cook immediately after thawing. 
Cook safely. Use a food thermometer to check the internal temperature of the turkey.  A whole turkey is 
safe cooked to a minimum internal temperature of 165 °F throughout the bird.  Check the internal 
temperature in the innermost part of the thigh and wing and the thickest part of the breast.  All turkey 
meat, including any that remains pink, is safe to eat as soon as all parts reach at least 165 °F.  The 
stuffing should reach 165 °F, whether cooked inside the bird or in a separate dish.  
Frying? 
If you plan to fry your turkey, here are some special considerations: 
♦ The turkey should be 12 pounds or less in size. 
♦ Do not fry a stuffed turkey, or one that has not been completely 
thawed.  Be sure to remove the giblets before frying. 
♦ Submerge the turkey completely in oil; oil should cover the turkey 
by 1 to 2 inches. 
♦ Select a safe outdoor location and heat the cooking oil to 350 °F.  
Slowly monitor the temperature of the oil with a thermometer 
constantly during cooking.  Never leave the hot oil unattended. Allow 
approximately 3 to 5 minutes per pound cooking time. 
Check the temperature of turkey with a food thermometer before 
eating.  It must be a minimum internal temperature of 165 °F in the 
innermost part of the thigh and wing and the thickest part of the breast. 
Store Leftovers Safely.  
Cut the turkey into small pieces; refrigerate stuffing and turkey separately in shallow containers within 2 
hours of cooking.  Use leftover turkey and stuffing within 3-4 days or freeze these foods. Reheat 
thoroughly to temperature of 165 °F or until hot and steaming. 
Sources: www.fsis.usda.gov/fact_sheets/Countdown_to_the_Holiday/index.asp  
www.fsis.usda.gov/factsheets/Turkey_Alt_Routes/index.asp#7 
